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Abstract
In 1976 the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Second District Court of Ap-
peal in Hillsborough Association for Retarded Citizens, Inc. v. City of Temple Terrace,’ wherein
the issue was the extent to which the state or its agencies may ignore local zoning regulations in
carrying out their proper functions, be they governmental or proprietary in nature.
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In 1976 the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Second
District Court of Appeal in Hillsborough Association for Retarded Citi-
zens, Inc. v. City of Temple Terrace,' wherein the issue was the extent
to which the state or its agencies may ignore local zoning regulations
in carrying out their proper functions, be they governmental or proprie-
tary in nature.2 In adopting the district court's opinion as its own, 3 the
Florida Supreme Court established the "balancing of interests" test as
the measure for determining on a case-by-case basis whether a state
agency enjoys immunity from local zoning provisions.4 In embracing
this test, the district court rejected the "superior sovereign ' 5 and "power
* B.A.E., J.D. University of Florida, 1970, 1974. Associate Professor of Law,
Nova University. The author wishes to thank her research assistant, Mary Jane Merola,
for her invaluable assistance in researching this article.
1. 332 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 1976), affg 322 So. 2d 571 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)
[hereinafter referred to as Temple Terrace].
2. A distinction between governmental and proprietary functions is frequently
used by courts to determine whether a political subdivision of the state attempt-
ing to locate an institutional facility is immune from local zoning regulation.
Proponents of the distinction contend that when the institutional use is "govern-
mental" the political unit performing such a function is immune from the con-
flicting zoning ordinance; when the use is "proprietary," however, the zoning
ordinance prevails . . . . [A] political unit performs a governmental function
if it is acting pursuant to and in furtherance of obligations imposed by legisla-
tive mandate. The unit performs a proprietary function if the act is permissive in
nature. . . .The classification of specific functions as governmental or proprie-
tary varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
Note, Governmental Immunity From Local Zoning Ordinances, 84 HARV. L. REV. 869,
869-70 (1971) (footnotes in the original are omitted). This governmental/proprietary
function distinction was essentially rejected by the district court in Temple Terrace. 322
So. 2d at 577-78.
3. 332 So. 2d at 612.
4. See 322 So. 2d at 578-79.
5. 322 So. 2d at 576-77. Under this test, "where immunity from a local zoning
oridnance is claimed by an agency occupying a superior position in the governmental
1
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of eminent domain"' tests as well as the "governmental/proprietary"
theory.7 In addition, the court noted that the "statutory guidance" test
was still valid but inoperative in Temple Terrace because there was no
applicable legislation to consult.' In addition to establishing the balanc-
ing of interests test for judicial use in settling inter-governmental zoning
squabbles, the district court9 and the supreme court"0 clearly placed on
the state the burden of seeking compromise with local authorities."
hierarchy, it is presumed that immunity was intended in the absence of express statutory
language to the contrary." Id. at 574.
6. Id. at 578. "Where the power of eminent domain has been granted to the
governmental unit seeking immunity from local zoning, some courts have concluded
that this conclusively demonstrates the unit's superiority where its proposed use conflicts
with zoning regulation." Id. at 574.
7. See note 2 supra.
8. Id. at 578. "While we acknowledge that a specific legislative statement on the
subject would control, in the absence of such a statement we must look to other criteria
in order to reach a decision." Id.
9. [T~he governmental unit seeking to use land contrary to applicable zon-
ing regulations should have the burden of proving that the public interests favor-
ing the proposed use outweigh those mitigating against a use not sanctioned by
the zoning regulations of the host government.
... [U]nder normal circumstances one would expect the agency to first
approach the appropriate governing body with a view toward seeking a change
in the applicable zoning or otherwise obtaining the proper approvals necessary
to permit the proposed use.
Id. at 579.
10. We conceive that the effect of our decision will be that the state will
always cooperate with local government when it has decided to achieve an objec-
tive by means of a non-conforming use. . . . [Liocal administrative proceedings
will provide the forum in which the competing interests of governmental bodies
are weighed.
332 So. 2d at 613.
Petitioner has raised here its concern that local governments will be able to thwart
state policy by refusing to approve zoning for legislative projects. The courts are
available, however, to review the balance struck in administrative proceedings.
Beyond that, . . . the State of Florida possesses the power to exempt itself from
local zoning ordinances.
Id. n.5.
1I. For general discussion of Temple Terrace, see Note, State Immunity From
Zoning: A Question ofReasonableness, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 191 (1976), and Commen-
tary, Immunity of State and State Related Activities from Local Municipal Zoning
Regulations: Florida Focus, 28 U. FLA. L. REV. 800 (1976).
The balancing of interests test was probably first fully proposed, though not so-
named, in a Note which appeared in the Harvard Law Review in 1971. Note,
Governmental Immunity From Local Zoning Ordinances, 84 HARV. L. REv. 869, 883
2
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The purpose of this brief article is to explore the possibility of the
extension of the holding of Temple Terrace beyond inter-governmental
zoning disputes to state/local conflicts in other areas of municipal con-
cern.
I. CASE IN POINT: THE BOCA BANYAN TREE
In 1978, the City of Boca Raton filed a complaint in Palm Beach
County Circuit Court against a construction company and the State of
Florida's Department of Transportation (F.D.O.T.). 12 The complaint
sought to enjoin the defendants from destroying a banyan tree located
within the right-of-way for improvements to a street without first apply-
ing for and obtaining from the city a tree removal permit pursuant to a
city ordinance. 13 Essentially, the ordinance provided that no tree could
be removed by any person without first obtaining a city permit and also
set forth certain conditions which must exist for a removal permit to
issue." Public rights-of-way were specifically included within the pur-
(1971). Since that time, a number of jurisdictions have embraced this test to resolve
inter-governmental zoning disputes involving various levels of government. See, e.g.,
City of Newark v. University of Delaware, 304 A. 2d 347 (Del. Ct. Ch. 1973), Kunimoto
v. Kawakami, 56 Haw. 582, 545 P. 2d 684 (1976), Brown v. Kansas Forestry, Fish &
Game Comm'n, 2 Kan. App. 2d 102, 576 P. 2d 230 (Ct. App. 1978), Town of Oronoco
v. City of Rochester, 293 Minn. 468, 197 N.W. 2d 426 (1972), Rutgers, State University
v. Piluso, 60 N.J. 142, 286 A.2d 697 (1972), Lincoln County v. Johnson, 257 N.W. 2d
453 (S.D. 1977). Additionally, Florida courts before Temple Terrace, were using a
balancing test to resolve zoning conflicts between governments. See, e.g., State ex rel.
Helseth v. Du Bose, 99 Fla. 812, 128 So. 4 (1930), and Palm Beach County v. Town of
Palm Beach, 310 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975).
Interestingly, in Lincoln County v. Johnson, supra, while the court applied the
balancing of interests test in deciding when a city was required to seek county ap-
proval for locating a sanitary landfill in the county on property owned by the city outside
the city limits, it also pointed out the possibility that:
State agencies such as public utility commissions or state highway authorities
have a political jurisdiction and a concomitant planning responsibility statewide
in scope transcending local boundaries. To be compelled to comply with local
zoning regulations might well thwart the state agency's attempt to perform its
public service function.
257 N.W. 2d 453, 457.
12. City of Boca Raton v. Crabtree Constr. Co., No. 78-1035 CA (Fla. 15th Cir.
Ct., filed March 21, 1978).
13. See generally, BOCA RATON, FLA., CODE ch. 21A (1978).
14. Id. § 21A-12.
3
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view of the ordinance. 15 In this case, circumstances were such that the
mandatory conditions were partially satisfied and the city was willing
to issue the removal permit if the defendants were willing to comply with
a permissive condition under the ordinance that the tree in question be
relocated or that trees and landscaping of equal value be placed in the
near vicinity.'6 Defendants refused.
In its memorandum in support of its request for permanent injunc-
tion, the city argued by analogy to Temple Terrace that the balancing
of interests test requires state agencies to apply for appropriate munici-
pal permits and to cooperate with local governments in any instance
where proposed state action would conflict with municipal ordinances. 17
In granting defendant F.D.O.T.'s Motion to Dismiss, the circuit court
found that Temple Terrace was "limited in impact of decision to zoning
matters only"" and in effect decided the case on the basis of a superior
sovereign test, finding no statutory waiver of the sovereign immunity of
the F.D.O.T. as an agency of the state.20
If the City of Boca Raton had appealed the banyan tree case,2' it
15. Id. § 21A-25.
16. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Request for Permanent Injunction at
6, City of Boca Raton v. Crabtree Constr. Co., No. 78-1035 CA (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct.
1978).
17. Id. at 4-6. The city recognized that this contention assumes that the source
of authority for the questioned municipal regulation probably must be Article VIII,
Section 2(b) of the Florida Constitution, in light of the supreme court's decision in
Dickinson v. City of Tallahassee, 325 So. 2d I (Fla. 1975), upholding state immunity
from municipal taxation. See text accompanying notes 23-24 and 31-35 infra. It must
also be noted that the city was not contending that it had the power to pass ordinances
in conflict with state law. See City of Miami Beach v. Fleetwood Hotel, Inc., 261 So.
2d 801, 806 (Fla. 1972). Instead, the city was attacking state action contrary to munici-
pal ordinance, which action was not specifically protected from municipal control by
state statute, the state constitution, or the general concept of sovereign immunity. See
text accompanying notes 31-35 infra.
18. F.D.O.T. responded to the city's complaint with a motion to dismiss on
various grounds. The road contractor, Crabtree Construction Company, filed a cross-
claim against F.D.O.T. and a counter-claim against the city. The dismissal was with
prejudice as the city stated at the hearing that it had nothing further to plead. The
dismissal operated in favor of Crabtree as it was acting as an agent of F.D.O.T.
19. City of Boca Raton v. Crabtree Constr. Co., No. 78-1035 CA (Fla. 15th Cir.
Ct., April 4, 1978).
20. Id.
21. The road project was delayed by other causes and, accordingly, the threat to
the banyan tree was removed. The remaining pleadings were dismissed by the parties
with stipulations that would permit the banyan tree to be removed when required and
4
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might have participated in some important law-making. It is the thesis
of this article that the position taken by the City of Boca Raton advocat-
ing the extension of the Temple Terrace rule beyond zoning matters was
well-founded and supportable by significant state constitutional and
legislative predicate.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR THE EXTENSION OF
THE TEMPLE TERRACE RULE: ARTICLE VIII,
SECTION 2(b)
In its review of the district court's decision in Temple Terrace, the
Florida Supreme Court was careful to distinguish that case from the
case of Dickinson v. City of Tallahassee," decided by the supreme
court after the district court issued its opinion in Temple Terrace:
In Dickinson we held that the state was immune from a municipal utility
tax, in part because Article VII, Section 9(a) of the Florida Constitution
did not expressly waive the state's sovereign immunity from taxation and
in part because the applicable statute did not expressly confer on munici-
palities the power to impose a utility tax on the state. Sovereign immunity
is no guide here as we deal with a zoning power of municipalities which
is derived from Article VIII, § 2(b) of the Florida Constitution ....24
From this language it is arguable that the supreme court should be
willing to favorably consider the application of the balancing of interests
test to state/local disputes regarding a municipality's exercise of any
power having the same constitutional lineage as municipal zoning pow-
ers, assuming no applicable legislation preserving sovereign immunity
(thus necessitating the use of the statutory guidance test rather than the
balancing of interests test)." What is the basis for the special signifi-
cance attached by the supreme court to Florida municipalities' Article
VIII, Section 2(b) powers?
the city to demand and enforce relocation or replacement landscaping. Interview with
Robert A. Eisen, Assistant City Attorney for the City of Boca Raton, Florida, in Boca
Raton (November 1, 1978).
22. To date, there is no case law, in Florida or elsewhere, concerning the extension
of the balancing of interests test to state/local conflicts outside the area of zoning.
23. 325 So. 2d I (Fla. 1975).
24. 332 So. 2d at 612.
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A. The 1968 Revision of the Florida Constitution: Home Rule
With respect to the existence and powers of municipalities, the 1885
Florida Constitution, as amended through 1967, provided in pertinent
part:
The Legislature shall have power to establish, and to abolish, municipali-
ties to provide for their government, to prescribe their jurisdiction and
powers, and to alter or amend the same at any time. 6
With the 1968 revision of the Florida Constitution came the follow-
ing replacement provisions in Article VIII, Section 2, regarding munici-
palities:
(a) ESTABLISHMENT. Municipalities may be established or abol-
ished and their charters amended pursuant to general or special law
(b) POWERS. Municipalities shall have governmental, corporate and
proprietary powers to enable them to conduct municipal government,
perform municipal functions and render municipal services, and may
exercise any power for municipal purposes except as otherwise provided
by law.?
The new Article VIII provision was apparently proposed for the
purpose of granting "home rule" powers to Florida municipalities. s In
the past municipalities had been constitutionally reliant on the legisla-
ture to grant municipal powers by general or special law, but now it
appeared cities could exercise any power assuming a municipal purpose
for such exercises and no state legislation to the contrary.29 The realiza-
26. Art. VIII, § 8, FLA. CONST. (1885). This section also provided that if a
municipality were abolished, provision must be made for the protection of its creditors.
27. (Emphasis added.) This revised section also retained the "protection of credi-
tors" provision of the former constitution and added the provision that municipal legis-
lative bodies be elected.
28. It was not generally conceded that the new Article VIII would accomplish
home rule for municipalities, however. See M. DAUER, C. DONOVAN, & G. KRAMMER,
SHOULD FLORIDA ADOPT THE PROPOSED 1968 CONSTITUTION? 33-36 (1968) (Public
Administration Clearing Service of the University of Florida: Studies in Public Admin-
istration No. 31, 1968). For a general discussion of the concept of municipal home rule,
see Vanlandingham, Municipal Home Rule in the United States, 10 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 269 (1968).
29. It should be noted, however, that prior to the 1968 constitutional revision the
legislature had chosen to grant limited legislative home rule to Florida cities.
("Although difficult to define, legislative home rule may be said to exist when the state
6
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tion of this change did not occur until 1973, however.3 0
B. Sovereign Immunity
Analysis of the home rule provisions of the 1968 constitution not-
withstanding, the question of state immunity to exercises of municipal
power still remains. Accepting the elementary premise of the state's
sovereign immunity, one seeking to deny such immunity must identify
a waiver of the privilege.31 The supreme court in Temple Terrace took
for granted the need tofind an express constitutional or statutory waiver
with respect to municipal exercise of powers under Article VII, and the
existence of an implied waiver with respect to exercise of Article VIII
legislature, in the absence of constitutional provision, empowers municipalities to adopt
and exercise home rule powers." Vanlandingham, supra note 27, at 273). This came
about in 1915 when a general act on municipal charter amendment was passed. Chapter
6940, §§ 1-15, Laws of Florida (1915). The first section of the chapter limited the scope
of municipal home rule to modification of local government structures, election proce-
dures, and the mode of exercising existing powers:
Every city . . . may . . determine the manner in which its corporate powers
shall be exercised, by amending its charter, or adopting a new charter, consistent
with the constitution and the general laws of this state; or . . .consistent with
• ..[applicable] special laws; provided, however, that this article shall not be so
construed as to authorize any city . . . to enlarge its corporate powers beyond
the limitations prescribed by law .
Section 166.01, FLA. STAT. (1971).
30. The legislation referred to in note 29, supra, remained on the books after the
adoption of the 1968 constitution until 1973 when the Municipal Home Rule Powers
Act was passed (see notes 37-39 infra, and accompanying text) although in 1969 a new
section appeared in Chapter 167, Florida Statutes, the general chapter on municipal
powers:
(I) In accordance with the provisions of § 2(b), Art. VIII of the state
constitution, municipalities shall have governmental, corporate and proprietary
powers to enable them to conduct municipal government, perform municipal
functions, and render municipal services, and may exercise any power for munici-
pal purposes, except when prohibited by general or special law.
(2) The provisions of this section shall be so construed as to secure for
municipalities the broad exercise of home rule powers granted by the constitution.
Section 167.005, FLA. STAT. (1969). The result of including this provision at the begin-
ning of a laundry list of enumerated municipal powers in Chapter 167 as well as leaving
intact the very restrictive-sounding provision in § 166.01, recited supra, was understand-
able judicial confusion. See note 38 infra, especially, City of Miami Beach v. Fleetwood
Hotel, Inc., 261 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 1972).
31. Buck v. McLean, 115 So. 2d 764, 768 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1959).
1 3:1979 125 1
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powers.32 The court appeared to support this approach on the basis that
a municipality's Article VIII general home rule powers flow directly
from the constitution and are, therefore, self-executing, 33 whereas its
Article VII taxing powers are mandatory or permissive, but not self-
executing, therefore requiring legislative implementation. 3 "This con-
stitutional delegation of municipal authority differentiates [the two]."35
The necessary conclusion is that sovereign immunity is implicitly pre-
served by the constitution where there remains the opportunity, if de-
sired, of legislative waiver, but is implicitly waived when not preserved
in a constitutional provision granting self-executing powers.
3. LEGISLATIVE BASIS FOR EXTENSION OF THE
TEMPLE TERRACE RULE: THE MUNICIPAL
HOME RULE POWERS ACT OF 1973
In Temple Terrace, the supreme court pointed out that it was
dealing with a power of municipalities (zoning) derived from the state
constitution by way of the Municipal Home Rule Powers Act.3" The
court was referring to the 1973 revision of Florida Statutes37 belatedly
enacted by the legislature to reflect the reality of Article VIII, Section
32. 332 So. 2d at 612, as set forth in the text accompanying note 24 supra.
33. Home rule provisions are generally classified as self-executing, manda-
tory, and permissive. A self-executing provision . . . enables a city to adopt and
exercise home rule powers immediately without the necessity of state implement-
ing legislation. A mandatory provision ...stipulates that the state legislature
"shall" enact implementing legislation to provide for home rule adoption. A
permissive provision . . . merely authorizes home rule and empowers the state
legislatures to grant it at its discretion.
Vanlandingham, supra note 28, at 278 (footnotes in the original are omitted). That
Article VIII, Section 2(b) is self-executing is by no means an incontestable conclusion.
In fact, the supreme court did not expressly state in Temple Terrace that Article VIII,
Section 2(b) is self-executing or that Article VII, Section 9(a) is mandatory or permis-
sive only. However, that the court now accepts this principle is a logical inference to be
drawn from its comparison of the two provisions. But see note 38 infra.
34. In pertinent part, Article VII, § 9(a) provides: "[Miunicipalities shall. . . be
authorized by law to levy ad valorem taxes and may be authorized. . . to levy other
taxes. . . except ad valorem taxes on intangible personal property and taxes prohibited
by this constitution." (Emphasis added.) Compare Article VIII, § 2(b) as set forth in
the text accompanying note 27 supra.
35. 332 So. 2d at 613.
36. Id. at 612-13.
37. Ch. 73-129, § 1, Laws of Fla.
8
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2(b) of the 1968 Florida Constitution and to clear up judicial confusion
over the meaning and intent of the constitutional revision.
38. Compare City of Miami Beach v. Fleetwood Hotel, Inc., 261 So. 2d 801 (Fla.
1972) with City of Miami Beach v. Forte Towers, Inc., 305 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1974).
This is not the initial appearance of a rent control ordinance before this Court.
We dealt with a prior rent control ordinance of the city in [Fleetwood]; there we
affirmed a trial court order invalidating that ordinance. In so doing we stated that
a municipality has no power to enact a rent control ordinance "absent a legislative
enactment authorizing the exercise of such a power by a municipality"...
[Tiherefore, we must consider whether the municipality now has the power
to enact such an ordinance; that is, whether the enactment of [the Municipal
Home Rule Powers Act] after our decision in Fleetwood Hotel necessitates a
change in the result there reached. I believe it does .
Id. at 764-65 (Dekle, J., concurring specially).
In pertinent part, the Municipal Home Rule Powers Act (§§ 166.011-.411, Fla.
Stat., 1977) provides:
§ 166.021 Powers.-
(1) As provided in Section 2(b), Article VIII of the State Constitution,
municipalities shall have the . . . powers to enable them to conduct municipal
government, perform municipal function, and render municipal services, and may
exercise any power for municipal. purposes, except when expressly prohibited
from law.
(2) "Municipal purpose" means any activity or power which may be exer-
cised by the state or its political subdivisions.
(3) The Legislature recognizes that pursuant to the grant of power set forth
in § 2(b), Article VIII of the State Constitution, the legislative body of each
municipality has the power to enact legislation concerning any subject matter
upon which the state Legislature may act, except:
(a) The subjects .. which require general or special law pursuant to...
the State Constitution;
(b) Any subject expressly prohibited by the Constitution;
(c) Any subject expressly preempted to state or county government by the
Constitution or by general law; and
(d) Any subject preempted to a county pursuant to a county charter
adopted under the authority of. . . the state constitution;
(4) The provisions of this section shall be so construed, as to secure for
municipalities the broad exercise of home rule powers granted by the Constitution
. . . and to remove any limitations, judicially imposed or otherwise, on the exer-
cise of home rule powers other than those. . . expressly prohibited.
§ 166.042 Legislative intent.-
(I) It is the legislative intent that the repeal [of certain statutes pertaining
to municipal powers] shall not be interpreted to limit or restrict the powers of
municipal officials, but shall be interpreted as a recognition of constitutional
powers. It is, further, the legislative intent to recognize residual constitutional
home rule powers in municipal government, and the Legislature finds that this
can best be accomplished by the removal of legislative direction from the statutes.
127 113:1979
9
Eisen: Protecting Municipalities Against Unnecessary State Infringement:
Published by NSUWorks, 1979
128 Nova Law Journal 3:1979 1
Prior to the passage of the 1973 act it was necessary to find legis-
lative authorization to municipalities to legislate in the field of zoning,
tree removal, and all other areas of municipal concern. This was true
even during the period after the 1968 constitutional revision until pas-
sage of the Municipal Home Rule Powers Act, the broad language of
Article VIII, Section 2(b) notwithstanding. 9 Under the act, however,
a municipality may legislate with respect to almost any subject pur-
suant to Article VIII, Section 2(b).10 This means that most powers
exercisable by a municipality are Article VIII powers, as was the zoning
power in Tem ple Terrace.41
Recalling the holding of the supreme court in Temple Terrace that
sovereign immunity was no guide in a case dealing with the zoning
power of municipalities "which is derived from Article VIII, § 2(b) of
the Florida Constitution by way of the Municipal Home Rule Powers
Act,"42 the logical conclusion is that sovereign immunity would be in-
operative, in the absence of preservative legislation, as to most of the
powers exercisable by municipalities today. By further analogy to
Temple Terrace, the duty of the state to seek compromise with munici-
pal authorities where city regulations pose an obstacle to state action is
clear, as is the necessity of using the balancing of interests test in judicial
solution of unresolved state/local conflicts.
4. CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis demonstrates the existing opportunity for
Florida courts to recognize in an appropriate case the pre-eminence of
municipal authorities vis-A-vis the state and its agencies where neither
the state constitution nor the legislature has expressly provided sover-
eign immunity from local rules and regulations. It is nonetheless possi-
ble that courts will be reluctant to extend the Temple Terrace rule to
It is, further, the legislative intent that municipalities shall continue to exercise
all powers heretofore conferred on municipalities. . . but shall hereafter exercise
those powers at their own discretion, subject only to the terms and conditions
which they choose to prescribe.
39. See text accompanying notes 26-30 supra.
40. For those subjects on which a municipality may not legislate, see § 166.021(3),
Fla. Stat. (1977) as set forth in note 38 supra. The municipal taxing power is not an
Article VIII power, being specifically spoken to in Article VII.
41. See 332 So. 2d at 612.
42. Id. at 612-13.
10
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non-zoning cases. Accordingly, it is proposed that the Florida Legisla-
ture amend the Municipal Home Rule Powers Act as follows:*
An Act relating to the powers of municipalities; creating section
166.042(3), F.S., to provide a statement of legislative intent that the state,
the counties, and their agencies must comply with, or obtain waivers of
compliance with, municipal regulations in those municipalities in which
they operate; providing the criterion to be judicially applied in deciding
questions of wrongful denial of waiver.
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida:
166.042 Legislative Intent.-
(3)(a) It is the legislative intent that municipal ordinances and
other regulations passed pursuant to s. 2(b), Art. VIII of the State Consti-
tution and this Act shall be complied with by the state and counties and
their agencies unless otherwise provided by general or special law, includ-
ing county charters. This requirement may be fulfilled by applying for
and receiving from the appropriate municipal authority a variance or
other waiver of compliance.
(b) In the event a state or county or an agency thereof is denied
a requested variance or other waiver of compliance with a municipal
ordinance or regulation, the state or county or agency thereof may seek
judicial review in a court of competent jurisdiction, which court shall
determine which governmental authority, on balance, possesses the
greater interest in maintaining its course of action. Sovereign immunity
shall not be inferred from any legislative grant of power in the absence
of a specific provision for sovereign immunity.
The effects of this proposal would be to translate to legislative
mandate the judicial rule in Temple Terrace beyond the limited applica-
tion inferred by the circuit court in the Boca banyan tree case and to
lend added significance to local ordinances evidencing the will of a local
citizenry on important local issues which are not transcended by state
necessity.
* Editor's Note: The author's proposed legislation has been pre-filed for consider-
ation in the 1979 session of the Florida Legislature as House Bill 531.
129 113:1979
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